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In this research project we examine the long-term economic effects of the recruitment of
soldiers from Nepal into the Indian and British Army.
Motivation: There is a large literature on the labor market and educational returns to
military service. In most countries, the military is a unique employer, not just because of
its size (the military is typically one of the largest employers), but also because the military
tends to recruit disproportionally more from disadvantaged groups, it offers extensive
training on the job, and it requires its employees to live away from their home and family.
Hence, voluntary military service in professional armed forces could expose disadvantaged
recruits to new ideas and skills, which in turn could improve the economic opportunities of
theirs and their families. In the context of the US armed forces, evidence suggests that
recruits from disadvantaged groups benefit mildly from voluntary service in terms of
earnings (Angrist, 1998). However, very little evidence is available on how these findings
translate to a developing country context. Nevertheless, the returns to military service in
professional armies could be much higher in developing countries, as the average human
capital in their populations tends to be lower. In a recent paper, Vanden Eynde (2016) shows
how voluntary war time service in the colonial Indian Army raised literacy rates in heavily
recruited communities. In spite of mild evidence of intergenerational transfers, this paper
cannot assess long term impacts because of the dramatic population movements that took
place during India’s Partition. Our project tries to estimate the long-term effects of military
recruitment in a country that offers a particularly interesting environment to assess the longterm impacts of military service: Nepal.
The British colonizers were particularly impressed by the fighting skills of the so-called
“Gurkha’s” during the Gorkha war (1814-1816). As a result, 200 years ago, the East
India Company started to recruit soldiers from a large region that is now part of Nepal.
The Gurkha soldiers provided many regiments to the colonial Indian Army, and they were
heavily relied on during the two World Wars and more recently in the Falklands war or
in UN peacekeeping operations. After India’s independence, both the British and the Indian
army keep on recruiting soldiers from Nepal until the present days. Currently, 25,000
young Nepalese hill-men apply for not more than 250 positions each year. The
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transformational role that Gurkha soldiers played in the development of their villages is
well documented by historians and sociologists (e.g., Kergoat, 2008, p.273), who often
suggest that they are particularly instrumental in improving the educational facilities in
their communities. Our paper aims to provide the first quantitative evaluation of the
hypotheses that Gurkha recruitment contributed to the development of rural Nepal. Our
empirical strategy, which we will develop in more detail below, relies on the fact that
recruitment patterns were first established at the end of the 19th century but are likely to
have remained persistent ever since, as the networks of existing soldiers were used to
find new recruits. A key constraint that gave rise to concentrated recruitment at the end
of the 19th century could have been the reliance on a limited number of recruitment
centers, each responsible for the recruitment of certain tribal groups. We propose to use the
distance to these recruitment centers as an instrument for the intensity of Gurkha
recruitment, in order to identify the impact of Gurkha recruitment on economic and
educational outcomes.
While our project naturally contributes to the literature on military service described
above, we will also contribute to the literature on the long-term impact of migration on
sending countries (Chauvet and Mercier, 2014). Moreover, our work will help to understand
the persistent effects of military recruitment during the colonial period, adding to work about
the long-term impact of colonial institutions (e.g. Huillery, 2009; Dell, 2010).
Data and empirical approach: Our project will use data from the Nepalese census
(1991, 2001, a n d 2011) and the Nepal Living Standard Survey (1995-1996, 2003-2004,
and 2010-2011) to measure education, income, and public good provision at the level of
individuals and villages (“VDCs”). I have already worked with this data for existing papers
(Baland et al., 2015, Libois, 2015).
Our suggested instrument will use distance to the 19th century recruitment centers for the
relevant tribes. We have already located the 6 recruitment centers on GIS maps (see map
in appendix).
To test our first stage, we require information about the recruitment intensity in Nepalese
villages. We suggest measuring the exposure of villages to military recruitment from
different sources. First, we can use the distribution of World War casualties as a proxy for
recruitment intensities, as in Vanden Eynde (2016) and Jha and Wilkinson (2015). We
cleaned the casualty data and have now extracted village names for almost all casualties. A
second potential source of recruitment estimates are administrative sources from the British
administration. We have identified historical sources that can be consulted in the British
Library (London) that will probably contain lists of heavily recruited villages.
Empirical approach included instrument, potentially other criteria imposed by the Brits as
an IV (see VandenEynde 2016) and potentially exploit changes in the British recruitment
rules, especially concerning the minimal educational background of applicants and their
ethnic membership, to estimate the aspirational effect of recruitment based on difference-indifference between cohorts.
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Preliminary results: As preliminary strategy, we use the location of the two
recruitment centers and their outposts created by the British in 1885 (see map in the
appendix) and correlate them with measures of education at the household level. The
creation of these centers marks a turning point in Gurkha recruitment since Nepal and the
British started to cooperate to ease the recruitment process (Rathaur, 2001). Only four
ethnic groups of the Hills were recruited by the British: Magars, Gurungs, Rais and
Limbus.
Our hypothesis is that the recruitment in these specific communities has long term
persistent effects on education and still has some direct influence because past recruitment
hugely determines present recruitment, despite the displacement of the new recruitment
centers (in Katmandu and Pokhara).
Our preliminary results hold in three tables and are all organized in the same way. The
explanatory variables of interest are (1) the interaction between a variable identifying
household belonging to eligible ethnic groups (the “Gurkha” variable”) and the distance to
the closest recruitment center of 1885 and (2) the share of eligible households in a village
and the distance to the closest recruitment center. The first variable intend to capture benefit
limited to the historically eligible groups, while the second intend to capture public good
type effects. We control for Gurkha eligibility at the household or at the village level,
distance to the closest recruitment center in 1885, distance to the Southern border of
Nepal and distance to Kathmandu. In all regressions, we also include time and belt-zone
(see figure 2) fixed effects to clean our estimations from South-North or East-West effects.
We find that the closest to the historical location of a recruitment center an eligible
household lives, the highest is the average education of its teenagers. The first column of
table 1 indicates that if an eligible household lives 100km further away from a recruitment
center, one’s teenagers loose, on average, 0.4 years of education. The second column of
table 1 is consistent with the first, but shows that the effect might be driven by the share of
eligible households living in the village. This suspicion is confirmed by the third column.
All households living in a village with a large proportion of eligible households have a
higher level of education if they live closer to a recruitment center.
The story is less sharp while looking at the average level of education of adults (column
4-6 in table 1), nevertheless average education of adult might suffer more from compositional
effect. In table 2, we show that our results hold if we focus on the level of education
achieved by the most educated member of the household. Consistently with the story of path
dependence in the recruitment, columns 4-6 in table 3 show that eligible households do
receive more income from pensions today if they live closer to an historical recruitment
center, and less if they are far away. This is not the case for non-eligible households.
One consistent story with our preliminary findings is that former Gurkha soldiers have
higher income and use part of it to finance public goods helping all inhabitants of their
village to achieve higher level of education. The Gurkha recruitment would have positive
spillovers on their immediate neighbors.
Notice that our results are robust if we drop one of the historical recruitment centers.
Point estimates are however slightly smaller. This is particularly reassuring in the case of

Tribeni, the recruitment center based within Nepal because is it relatively close to Pokhara
(75km).
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APPENDIX

Villages surveyed in the second round of data collection (2003-2004)

TABLE 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Average education of teenagers
Average education of adults
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Gurkha X distanceto
-0.00410**
-0.00141
0.00181
0.00513***
1885 recruitment center [-2.50]
[-0.92]
[1.01]
[2.94]
Village Gurkha share X distance to
1885 recruitment center
Gurkha

-0.00993***
[-2.71]

-0.00852**
[-2.13]

0.238
[1.50]

Village Gurkha share

0.284*
[1.67]
0.315
[0.94]

Distance to closest
-0.00145
1885 recruitment center [-0.63]

-0.000253
[-0.11]

-0.00519
[-1.27]
-0.732***
[-3.80]

0.0289
[0.07]
-0.000265
[-0.11]

Distance to India

-0.00692**
[-2.27]

-0.00691**
[-2.33]

-0.00689**
[-2.32]

Distance to Kathmandu

-0.00277
[-1.47]

-0.00317*
[-1.71]

-0.00318*
[-1.72]

-0.742***
[-3.47]
-0.560
[-1.38]

-0.00377
[-1.44]

-0.0103**
[-2.27]

-0.00243
[-0.90]

0.182
[0.38]
-0.00243
[-0.90]

-0.0101***
[-2.70]

-0.00978***
[-2.67]

-0.00978***
[-2.67]

-0.00590***
[-2.63]

-0.00628***
[-2.84]

-0.00628***
[-2.84]

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Observations
6365
6365
6365
9217
9217
9217
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Standard errors clustered at the village level, t statistics in brackets, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All regressions include survey wave dummies and belt-zone fixed effects

18

TABLE 2
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Highest education level achieved in the householdHighest education level achieved in the
.
excluding household head
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Gurkha X distanceto
-0.00300
0.00226
-0.00497*
-0.000638
1885 recruitment center [-1.16]
[0.97]
[-1.95]
[-0.26]
Village Gurkha share X distance to
1885 recruitment center
Gurkha

-0.531**
[-2.02]

Village Gurkha share

Distance to closest
-0.00495
1885 recruitment center
[-1.33]
Distance to India

Distance to Kathmandu

-0.0142**
[-2.55]

-0.0172***
[-3.44]

-0.0165***
[-2.72]
-0.409
[-1.42]

-0.451
[-0.88]

-0.0418
[-0.07]

-0.00268
[-0.72]

-0.00268
[-0.72]

-0.0167***
[-3.45]

-0.0167***
[-3.45]

-0.0145***
[-2.74]
-0.234
[-0.86]

-0.00328
[-0.93]
-0.0184***
[-3.95]

-0.0138**
[-2.38]
-0.0888
[-0.30]

-0.220
[-0.43]

-0.132
[-0.22]

-0.00141
[-0.40]

-0.00140
[-0.40]

-0.0181***
[-4.01]

-0.0181***
[-4.01]

-0.00582*
-0.00661**
-0.00661**
-0.00557*
-0.00629**
-0.00629**
[-1.89]
[-2.20]
[-2.20]
[-1.90]
[-2.20]
[-2.20]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Observations
9221
9221
9221
8948
8948
8948
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Standard errors clustered at the village level, t statistics in brackets, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
All regressions include survey wave dummies and belt-zone fixed effects
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TABLE 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(1)
(2)
(3)
Age of household head
Income from pensions
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Gurkha X distanceto
-0.0269***
-0.0209**
1885 recruitment center [-3.05]
[-1.97]
Village Gurkha share X distance to
1885 recruitment center
Gurkha

3.368***
[3.72]

Village Gurkha share

Distance to Kathmandu

-0.0105
[-0.74]

-0.00454
[-0.54]
-0.0101
[-0.72]

-105.7*
[-4.35]

-0.0174
[-0.96]
2.448**
[2.21]

4.936***
[3.24]

Distance to closest
-0.00602
1885 recruitment center [-0.75]
Distance to India

-0.0383**
[-2.52]

(4

15802.
[5.20

2.487
[1.34]
-0.00454
[-0.54]
-0.0101
[-0.72]

0.0168**
0.0173**
0.0173**
[2.38]
[2.44]
[2.44]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Observations
9198
9198
9198
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Standard errors clustered at the village level, t statistics
in brackets, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 All regressions
include survey wave dummies and belt-zone fixed effects

-44.52
[-2.17]

-10.3
[-0.53

-17.3
[-0.93
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